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Visual object recognition and sensitivity to image features are largely influenced by contextual inputs. We study
influences by contextual bars on the bias to perceive or infer the presence of a target bar, rather than on the sensitivity
to image features. Human observers judged from a briefly presented stimulus whether a target bar of a known
orientation and shape is present at the center of a display, given a weak or missing input contrast at the target location
with or without a context of other bars. Observers are more likely to perceive a target when the context has a weaker
rather than stronger contrast. When the context can perceptually group well with the would-be target, weak contrast
contextual bars bias the observers to perceive a target relative to the condition without contexts, as if to fill in the
target. Meanwhile, high-contrast contextual bars, regardless of whether they group well with the target, bias the
observers to perceive no target. A Bayesian model of visual inference is shown to account for the data well, illustrating
that the context influences the perception in two ways: (1) biasing observers’ prior belief that a target should be
present according to visual grouping principles, and (2) biasing observers’ internal model of the likely input contrasts
caused by a target bar. According to this model, our data suggest that the context does not influence the perceived
target contrast despite its influence on the bias to perceive the target’s presence, thereby suggesting that cortical
areas beyond the primary visual cortex are responsible for the visual inferences.
Citation: Zhaoping L, Jingling L (2008) Filling-in and suppression of visual perception from context: A Bayesian account of perceptual biases by contextual influences. PLoS
Comput Biol 4(2): e14. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014
Introduction
Background
Visual inputs are ﬁrst represented in early visual stages
such as retina and the primary visual cortex (V1), such that
input features such as local color, orientation, luminance
contrast, and spatial scale of image patches are encoded by
the activities of retinal and V1 neurons with various input
sensitivities. The neural representation of inputs is then used
by the brain to infer the possible objects in the 3-D scene
causing the 2-D input images. For instance, from V19s
responses to the luminance edges in Figure 1A, the brain
could infer a white square surface behind a gray square
surface, likely employing cortical area V2 where neurons
tuned to surface border ownerships signal which of the
possible object surfaces is likely responsible for each
luminance edge [1,2]. Information about the object causes
are only ambiguously available, or even apparently missing, in
the 2-D images. As vision is an under-constrained or ill-posed
problem, the possible objects causing a given image are not
unique. For instance, the white L-shaped image patch in
Figure 1A is likely caused by a white square surface behind
the gray one in the 3-D world; but it is not impossible, though
less likely, that an L-shaped surface is the cause. Nevertheless,
perception is rarely ambiguous, typically revealing only (the
most likely) one cause at any time given an input. Here,
perception is deﬁned as the result of revealing a cause to
visual awareness, while inference is the process of assigning a
probability to each cause. As both perception and inference
are assessed operationally by the same observer reports, the
two words are often used interchangably in this paper. It is
difﬁcult to state the veridicality of the perception objectively.
For instance, a substantial part of the white square surface (in
the 3-D world) is not recorded in the 2-D input image, and
would be non-veridical in terms of image pixel values rather
than the 3-D world.
Visual inference from any part of the input is often
inﬂuenced by the contextual input. For instance, the more
likely cause for the white patch in Figure 1A or 1B is the
square or L-shaped surface respectively, due to the presence
or absence of the contextual gray patch. The speed and
accuracy to recognize an object, e.g., a sewing machine,
signiﬁcantly depend on, e.g., whether it is in an indoor or
outdoor scene [3]; and the color appearance of an image
patch depend on the surrounding patches [4]. This is
unsurprising since the missing or ambiguous information,
e.g., the occluded part of a face or the reﬂectance of a surface,
can only be ﬁlled in or deduced from the context through the
statistical knowledge about visual scenes, e.g., the correlations
between neighboring inputs. Contextual inﬂuences are also
present in the input encoding. For instance, the sensitivity of
a V1 neuron to an input bar can be increased by contextual
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[5–7], and this colinear facilitation has been manifested in
human sensitivity to detect a small bar or gabor (or grating)
patch [8–13].
We are interested in contextual inﬂuences in inference of
objects from images, focusing in this paper on the perception
in the spatial context of other inputs. Most previous studies
on inﬂuences by spatial context used quite complex inputs
such as photographs of everyday scenes [14,15], demonstrat-
ing very interesting phenomena [16]. However, these com-
plex inputs are difﬁcult to manipulate systematically, and the
complex spatial relationships between image features [15] are
difﬁcult to describe and model in an intuitive and mean-
ingful way, unless when the exact spatial relationship is not
essential such as when inferring surface color appearance
[17]. This study uses stimuli that are easy to manipulate and
describe. They are composed of several bars, like those used
in probing contextual inﬂuences on input sensitivity [8–
10,12,13].
The previous studies used the stimuli of bars to probe input
sensitivities by the two-alternative forced choice (2AFC)
design. In contrast, we probe perceptual biases by a yes–no
design. In each trial of the 2AFC design, two brief intervals of
the stimuli are presented: both intervals contain the same
contextual input but only one contains the target, and the
observer has to answer which interval contains the target. The
input sensitivity is inversely linked with the minimum target
input (contrast) necessary to enable about 80% of the
responses by the observers to be correct. It has long been
known [18] that measurements from the 2AFC tasks remove
the effect of any perceptual or response bias (e.g., on whether
the target bar is present), whether the bias arises from the
contextual inputs or other factors. In each trial of a yes–no
task, after only one stimulus presentation interval, observers
have to answer ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ regarding whether they perceive
a target bar, i.e., whether the target rather than noise is the
inferred cause of the luminance proﬁle at the would-be target
location in the input image. Whether the answer is veridical
according to the input images is not the issue; rather, we
assess whether the observer perceives or infers the target bar,
even if its contrast is missing in the input image. This yes–no
task thus assesses the bias (to respond ‘‘yes’’) in inferring the
target object. One particular bias is ﬁlling-in, which we deﬁne
as a behavioral indication of a target object (by responding
‘‘yes’’) when there is no input contrast at the corresponding
image location. Note that ﬁlling-in here is not deﬁned as
(mentally) painting-in a luminance contrast at the image
location corresponding to the target object when the input
contrast is zero. Analogously, amodel perceptual completion
of the occluded square (in Figure 1A) is achieved without
seeing any contrast at the image location for the occluded
part of the square.
We report in this paper that our study, using the bar
stimuli and the yes–no task, revealed how visual contexts
inﬂuence the perception of the target bar through a Bayesian
inference and decision process. In particular, quite unex-
pectedly from the ﬁnding of colinear facilitation of input
sensitivities revealed neurophysiologically and behaviorally
(by the 2AFC task), we found that weaker colinear contexts
induce stronger biases to ﬁll-in the missing target. In the
framework of a model of the Bayesian process, our data
suggest that contextual facilitation or suppression of input
sensitivities plays no role in the inference probed by our task,
and hence the neural substrate responsible for this inference
is more likely beyond V1. In the rest of the Introduction, we
formulate the Bayesian model applied to our yes–no task. The
Results section then presents our experiments probing the
contextual inﬂuences in human inference behavior and the ﬁt
of our data by the Bayesian model. The Discussion section will
summarize the ﬁndings with discussions.
Figure 1. Demonstration of Inferences of Objects from Images
(A) and (B) show two images containing the same white patch, and (C)
and (D) show the two possible inferred objects in the scene causing this
white patch. The inferred causes for any particular input image patch is
not unique, although some inferences are more likely than others. The
difference in the most likely inferred object for the same image patch in
(A) and (B) demonstrates that inference could be greatly influenced by
the image context.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g001
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Author Summary
We study how visual perception of a target bar can be biased by
contextual bars in the image, and how a Bayesian model of object
inference can account for the data. Human observers are more likely
to perceive a target bar when the contextual contrast, i.e., the
luminance difference between the contextual bars and background,
is weaker rather than stronger. Relative to the situation without the
context, they are biased to perceive the target in a context of weak
contrast when the target can perceptually group well with the
context, as if the context fills in the target. Meanwhile, they are
biased not to perceive the target in a context of strong contrast, as if
the context suppresses the perception, regardless of whether it
could perceptually group well with the would-be target. The
Bayesian model illustrates that the context influences the percep-
tion by biasing (1) observers’ prior belief that a target should be
present and (2) observers’ internal model of the likely input
contrasts from a target bar. Our data suggest that brain areas
beyond the primary visual cortex along the visual pathway are
responsible for inferring object causes for input images.
Filling-In and Suppression from ContextThe Bayesian Model of Contextual Influence on Visual
Inference from Simple Bar Stimuli
The formulation. The Bayesian inference and decision
process applied to our task is formulated as follows [18,19].
Let a stimulus pattern contain input contrast Ct and Cc for the
target and contextual bars respectively, evoking neural
responses xt and xc, respectively, in the early visual stages.
When the target is absent in the image, Ct ¼ 0. For
presentation simplicity without loss of generality, the target
and context are assumed as sufﬁciently far apart spatially to
evoke dissociable responses. The brain infers from xt whether
the target is present, i.e., whether xt is caused by the target
bar or noise, by assigning a probability P(yes j xt) that a target
is present given response xt. By Bayesian theorem,
PðyesjxtÞ}PxcðxtjyesÞPxcðyesÞ, where PxcðxtjyesÞ is the probability,
by the brain’s internal model, of response xt to a target, and
PxcðyesÞ is the prior probability, believed by the brain, that a
target should be present. Hence, P(yes j xt) is the posterior
probability in the Bayesian terminology. Note that PxcðxtjyesÞ
is not a typical likelihood term in Bayesian terminology in
which the likelihood typically means the conditional proba-
bility of neural response xt if the experimenter presented a
target—instead, PxcðxtjyesÞ is what the brain thinks the
probability of response xt should be when the brain assumes
that xt is caused by a target, whether or not the experimenter
actually presented the target. The subscript xc in PxcðxtjyesÞ
and PxcðyesÞ indicates that both could be inﬂuenced (or
parameterized) by the response xc to the context. To minimize
the mean response error (assumed as the loss function in the
decision), the observer’s optimal response to the question ‘‘is
the target present?’’ is ‘‘yes’’ when P(yes j xt) . 0.5 and ‘‘no’’
otherwise. With input and neural noise, the neural responses
xt (and xc), and consequently P(yes j xt) and the observer’s
response, can vary from one trial to another given a ﬁxed
input presentation. Averaged over many trials of a given
input image, one can measure the probability P(yes j Ct)o f
response ‘‘yes’’ given a target contrast Ct (and context). We
can phenomenologically call P(yes j Ct) the posterior, as the
brain’s inferred probability of a target being present given
the input contrast Ct. It is the counterpart or the manifes-
tation of P(yes j xt), internal to the brain and inaccessible to
our behavioral measurements. The Appendix section gives a
detailed formulation to arrive analogously at the phenom-
enological internal model P(Ct j yes) and phenomenological
prior P(yes), the counterparts of PxcðxtjyesÞ and PxcðyesÞ,
respectively. For simplicity in the main text, we use this
phenomenological language to present the rest of our
formulation of the inference process, and omit the details
of the decision process (of choosing to respond ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’
given P(yes j xt)) unless it is necessary (e.g., in the Discussion
section). To avoid notational clutter, different probabilities,
e.g., P(yes) and P(Ct j yes), are simply denoted by the differences
in the variables, with no or minimum notations for the
parameter dependences.
In the Bayesian model, the inferred probability P(yes j Ct)
that Ct is caused by a target bar arise from weighing the two
probabilities: one is the probability P(yes)P(Ct j yes) that Ct
could arise from a target, the other is the probability P(no)P(Ct
j no) that Ct could arise from ‘‘no target’’ or noise. Here, P(yes)
and P(no) ¼ 1   P(yes) are the prior probabilities, assumed by
the brain, of a target as present and absent respectively; and
P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) are the brain’s internal models of the
probabilities of having input contrast Ct at the would-be
target location when the brain assumes the target is present
or absent respectively. Hence,
PðyesjCtÞ¼
PðCtjyesÞPðyesÞ
PðCtjyesÞPðyesÞþPðCtjnoÞPðnoÞ
: ð1Þ
Note that P(yes), P(no), P(Ct j yes), and P(Ct j no) are the
internal belief or models in the observer’s brain. In
particular, P(yes)i snot the probability that the experimenter
actually presented a target bar at the target location, nor is
P(Ct j yes) the probability that a contrast Ct is presented at the
target location by the experimenter, the ‘‘yes’’ in P(Ct j yes)
refers to the brain’s assumed condition of a target present
rather than the actual presence of a target placed by the
experimenter. Throughout the paper, ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ always
refer to the observer’s responses or internal variables in his/
her brain rather than the experimenter’s stimulus presenta-
tion.
Both P(yes) and P(Ct j yes) are subject to observer’s biases,
which can be inﬂuenced by the context, as illustrated in
Figure 2. If one occluded from view the target but not the
contextual bars, the prior P(yes) is the observer’s expected
probability that the target is present behind the occluder. So,
P(yes) is higher in a colinear context, which is seen as more
likely to group with target. The context also inﬂuences P(Ct j
yes) by making observers expect that the target and contextual
bars should have similar contrasts, i.e., the probability P(Ct j
yes) of the target contrast Ct should peak around Ct ¼ Cc (see
Figure 2B). We thus have the model
PðCtjyesÞ¼
expð jCt   Ccj=ryÞ
Ny
; ð2Þ
where ry models the uncertainty about the target contrast,
and Ny ¼ ry½2   expð Cc=ryÞ expð ð1   CcÞ=ryÞ  is the
normalization constant for the probability distribution on
the contrast range 0   Ct   1. It is reasonable to assume (see
the Appendix section for justiﬁcations) that ry is propor-
tional to Cc with a Weber-like scale factor k,
ry ¼ kCc: ð3Þ
Without the context P(Ct j yes) is assumed (its exact form
does not matter, as it is never ﬁtted to the data) to become
PðCtjyesÞ}expð Ct=r0Þ with a contrast uncertainty r0. The
brain also assumes that input contrast Ct caused by noise or
other non-target factors to be near zero; hence,
PðCtjnoÞ¼
expð Ct=rnÞ
Nn
; ð4Þ
where Nn ¼ rn½1   expð r 1
n Þ , with contrast uncertainty rn
determined by the observer’s internal model of the noise.
From Equations 1–4, we see that three parameters: P(yes), k,
and rn can completely model P(yes j Ct) for all Cc and Ct, given
a contextual conﬁguration which determines P(yes).
The elaborations. One may think of P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no)
as evidences for a target present and absent, respectively, and
the observer arrives at his response probability P(yes j Ct)b y
combining the evidences with his prior belief P(yes) and P(no).
Both the priors and the evidences are inﬂuenced by the
context—the prior P(yes) by the contextual conﬁguration
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Filling-In and Suppression from Contextwhile the evidence P(Ct j yes) by the resemblance between the
contextual contrast Cc and the input contrast Ct. In general,
one could model the evidence P(Ct j yes) and prior P(yes) such
that each could be affected by both the conﬁguration and the
contrast of the context. Insufﬁcient motivation for such a
generality, which would nevertheless require additional
model parameters, justiﬁes eliminating it by Occam’s razor.
Figure 2C illustrates that a higher contextual contrast Cc
gives a lower P(yes j Ct) or suppresses the perception of a
target with small Ct, since it makes the low contrast Ct seem as
unlikely caused by a target rather than noise. This is because,
when the context is clearly visible while the target is barely
visible, Ct , Cc (as is always the case in our experiment), the
evidence PðCtjyesÞ¼exp½ ðCc   CtÞ=ðkCcÞ =Ny decreases with
increasing Cc. In detail, if context one and context two have
the same conﬁguration but different contrasts Cc1 and Cc2
such that Cc1 . Cc2 . Ct, let Pc1 and Pc2 denote the proba-
bility P(Ct j yes)u n d e rCc1 and Cc2 respectively, then,
Pc2=Pc1}exp ðCt=kÞ 1
Cc2   1
Cc1
   hi
  1 (provided that the normal-
ization constant Ny for Cc1 is larger than that for Cc2, which is
Figure 2. Bayesian Inference for Target Perception
(A) Schematics of perceiving a weak vertical target bar in three different contexts. Colinear contexts give a higher prior belief P(yes) of the target
present, as it could be grouped with the context. Higher contextual contrast Cc makes a low contrast input Ct at the would-be target location seem less
likely to be caused by a target rather than noise, since observers expect a target to evoke a contrast similar to Cc, i.e., P(Ct j yes) peaks at Ct ’ Cc, and P(Ct
j yes) ’ 0i fCt   Cc; see (B).
(B) the probability P(yes j Ct)o f‘‘yes’’ response depends on the ratio between the evidences P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) for target present and absent,
respectively, when the prior belief P(yes) ¼ 0.5 is unbiased. This ratio should be multiplied by P(yes)/(1   P(yes)) in general. Note that probability
distributions P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) peak at Ct ¼ Cc and Ct ¼ 0, respectively.
(C,D) Effects of the contextual contrast Cc (C) and of the prior P(yes) (D) by the Bayesian model. In (C) and (D), all curves have model parameters k¼2 and
rn¼0.0015, the two red curves are identical, with P(yes)¼0.95 and Cc¼0.01. Comparing (C) and (D), a higher contextual contrast Cc has a similar effect
as a lower prior P(yes).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g002
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Filling-In and Suppression from Contextindeed the case for us, as shown in the Appendix section).
Meanwhile (see Figure 2D), given a contextual contrast Cc
(and thus the evidence P(Ct j yes)), one is more likely to expect
a target in the colinear than non-colinear context since the
prior belief P(yes) is higher in the colinear context.
Figure 2B illustrates that in some ranges of input contrast
Ct, the evidences P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) for and against a
target’s presence, respectively, are very different from each
other, i.e., PðCtjyesÞ=PðCtjnoÞ!‘ or 0. In such a case, the
evidences are unambiguous, diminishing the effect of a prior
P(yes), making the responses (with probability P(yes j Ct)) also
unambiguous. This happens over a large range of small Ct
when a stronger contextual contrast Cc pulls the distributions
P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) apart from each other. When Cc is
sufﬁciently low, there is a sizable range of low input contrast
Ct in which the evidences P(Ct j yes) and P(Ct j no) for and
against a target are comparable, i.e., the evidences are
ambiguous, giving the prior P(yes) the power to sway the
response probability P(yes j Ct).
Filling-in, which occurs when Ct ¼ 0 but P(yes j Ct)i s
substantial, is an example when the prior sways the response.
It happens particularly when the noise level rn is high, such
that a zero input contrast Ct could be caused by the target or
the noise, i.e., P(Ct¼0 j yes) is non-negligible compared to P(Ct
¼ 0 j no). The observer’s ‘‘yes’’ response when Ct ¼ 0i s
analogous to perceiving a white square in Figure 1A without
perceiving any luminance contrast at the image location for
the occluded corner of the square. For the partially occluded
square, perception attributes the missing luminance to the
occluder. For the ﬁlled-in target bar, perception attributes
the zero contrast Ct ¼ 0 to input or neural noise (such as the
noise in the photoreceptors or V1 neurons), which causes
input contrasts and/or brain responses to ﬂuctuate away from
their supposed levels in the noise-free situation. Hence, a
‘‘yes’’ response to zero target contrast, the result of a decision
based on a perception (even if vaguely) of the target, is no less
veridical than the perception of the partially occluded
square. Analogously, one may perceive no target even under
non-zero input contrast Ct, when the evidence P(Ct j yes) for a
target is insufﬁcient and Ct is attributed to or explained away
by noise, depressing the posterior probability P(yes j Ct).
The Bayesian inference described above predicts in
particular: (1) a weak context encourages ﬁlling-in of the
visual target object when it is consistent or easily grouped
with the target, i.e., P(yes) is large; (2) a sufﬁciently strong
context can suppress the perception of a weak target since
the strong context bias the observer to presume a weak input
contrast Ct as caused by noise rather than a target; and (3) the
prior belief P(yes) can be inﬂuenced by the spatial conﬁg-
uration of the context in a way that is consistent with the
statistical properties of visual inputs. We report experiments
conﬁrming the predictions next.
Results
In the experiments, human observers were asked to answer
whether or not they perceive the target by pressing a button.
They were informed that the target when present was a nearly
visible vertical bar at the center of the ﬁxation array, and that
they should make their judgments according to the target
alone regardless of the context. We only used naive observers
to minimize any systematic bias not related to the contextual
stimuli. In each trial, the particular target and contextual
(contrast and conﬁguration) condition was unpredictably
chosen among all conditions within an experiment.
Experiment 1: Weaker Contexts Give Higher Yes Rates
P(yes j Ct)
In experiment 1, the context has 10 colinear bars on each
side of the target bar (Figure 2A), and its contrast can be one
of Cc ¼ 0, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.4, with Cc ¼ 0 for the no context
baseline condition. This is to investigate whether weaker and
stronger contexts do give higher and lower yes rates P(yes j Ct)
respectively as predicted. Here contrast is deﬁned by
Michelson contrast C ¼ (Lmax   Lmin)/(Lmax þ Lmin) where Lmax
is the luminance of the bar and Lmin that of background. Each
bar is a rectangle of 0.9830.1658 in size, and the centers of the
neighboring bars were 1.158 apart. The possible target
contrast Ct ¼ 0, 0.002, 0.004, 0.006, and 0.008 span a range
from below to somewhat above the typical human contrast
detection threshold without context. Each test image was
presented for 24 trials for each observer.
We found that (Figure 3) compared to the yes rates under
no context, the mean yes rates averaged over six observers are
higher under low contextual contrast Cc   0.05 and lower
under higher contextual contrast Cc ¼ 0.4, for any target
contrast Ct. We deﬁne a contextual facilitation index (CFI) as
the average increase in the yes rate in a particular context
(relative to no context), speciﬁcally
CFI[MeanCt½PðyesjCt;a given contextÞ
  PðyesjCt;without contextÞ ;
ð5Þ
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 1, Where the Colinear Context
Resembles the Two Left Ones in Figure 2A
The data points are the mean over six observers, and the error bars
indicate the standard errors of the means (SEMs). On average and relative
to the no-context condition, the weaker colinear contexts Cc ¼ 0.01 and
Cc ¼ 0.05 raised the yes rates by CFI ¼ 38% 6 8% and 15% 6 8%,
respectively, whereas the stronger context Cc ¼ 0.4 lowered it by CFI ¼
17% 6 8%. The colored curves are Bayesian fits to data of the
corresponding color, no fit is done for data without context. The root
mean square normalized fitting error RMSNFE¼ 0.66 in the unit of SEM.
The fitted parameters (and their 95% confidential intervals) are k ¼ 1.9
(0.6, 3.2), rn ¼ 0.0025 (0.0020, 0.0029), and P(yes) ¼ 0.972 (0.967, 0.978).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g003
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P
Ct x =½
P
Ct 1  stands for the average of x
over Ct. The weakest context Cc ¼ 0.01 raises the yes rate by
CFI ¼ 0.38 6 0.08, and the intermediate context Cc ¼ 0.05 by
CFI ¼ 0.15 6 0.08. In contrast, the strongest context Cc ¼ 0.4
lowers the yes rate by jCFIj¼0.17 6 0.08. Averaged over Ct, the
observers were more than twice as likely to perceive a target
in the weakest than in the strongest context.
The mean yes rates with the context are 86% 6 4%, 63%
6 6%, and 32% 6 5%, respectively, for Cc ¼ 0.01, 0.05, and
0.4 and 48% 6 9% without the context. However, the mean
yes rate over trials of all target and contextual conditions is
57% 6 5.5%, suggesting that observers have an internal,
stimulus unrelated, prior to roughly equalize their total
numbers of ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ responses, even though we did not
give them any indication of the expected rate of ‘‘yes’’
responses. If the experiment had only one contextual
(contrast and conﬁguration) condition, this internal prior
could at least partly overwrite the prior caused by the
context. Hence, interleaving different contextual conditions
within a session helps to manifest and differentiate percep-
tual biases caused by different contexts.
The adequacy of the Bayesian model is demonstrated by its
reasonable ﬁt to the data from the three non-zero contextual
contrast conditions, using only three parameters k, rn, and
P(yes). Let Pdata(yes j Ct) and Pﬁtted(yes j Ct) be the measured
(mean) and ﬁtted yes rates, and dPdata(yes j Ct) the SEM error of
Pdata(yes j Ct), and E [ Pdata(yes j Ct)   Pﬁtted(yes j Ct) the ﬁtting
error. For each data point i denoting a particular contextual
and target condition, we denote the ﬁtting error and the SEM
error as Ei and di, respectively. The quality of the Bayesian ﬁt
for a total of N data points can be quantiﬁed by the root
mean squared normalized ﬁtting error deﬁned as
RMSNFE ¼
X N
i¼1
E2
i =d
2
i
 !
=N
"# 1=2
; ð6Þ
which indicates the ﬁtting error in the units of the SEM
errors of the mean yes rates. When RMSNFE , 1, for
instance, the ﬁtted curve is within the size of the error bars
from the measured data for typical data points. The ﬁtting
ﬁnds the optimal set of Bayesian model parameters k, rn, and
P(yes) that minimizes this RMSNFE. Our ﬁt to a total of N¼3
35 data points for the 3 yes rate curves gives RMSNFE¼0.66.
Note that, a psychometric function parameterized by two or
more parameters can typically ﬁt a single yes rate curve
(which in our case contains ﬁve data points). For instance, a
logistic function PðyesjCtÞ¼1=ð1 þ expðða   CtÞ=bÞÞ with two
parameters, a and b, could also reasonably ﬁt a yes rate curve
in our data. However, three logistic functions or a total of six
parameters would be needed to ﬁt three yes rate curves.
Hence, ﬁtting our data for three yes rate curves within the
error bar by the Bayesian model, using only a total of three
parameters, reﬂects the adequacy of the Bayesian account.
Note that ﬁtting the yes rate data for the no context
condition by the Bayesian model would require two additional
parameters, r0 and the prior probability Pno context(yes) under
no context, as many as needed by the logistic ﬁt. Hence, ﬁtting
this curve well by the Bayesian model adds no additional
strength to the Bayesian account. In fact, since the parameter
rn is already determined from ﬁtting the three yes curves for
the colinear context, the two additional Bayesian parameters
r0 and Pno context(yes) are under determined (i.e., many different
choices of r0 and Pno context(yes) would give roughly equally good
ﬁts) for a curve that needs only two essential parameters. Thus
we display these data as they are without any model ﬁtting.
The higher yes rates under weaker contextual contrasts Cc
are not expected from the assumption or expectation that
neurons responding to the colinear context should increase
the neural response to the target as if the target has an
effective contrast C
effective
t higher than the actual input contrast
Ct. If colinear facilitation did make C
effective
t ¼ Ct þ DCt, then
thechange DCt should depend on the contextual contrast Cc by
some function as DCt ¼ f(Cc) such that f(0) ¼ 0. Then, our
Bayesian formulation should replace each Ct in the right-hand
side of Equation 1 by C
effective
t . To the ﬁrst order (linear)
approximation, DCt ’ cCc, where c is the coefﬁcient of
facilitation. We can then repeat our Bayesian ﬁt with now an
additional model parameter c. As expected, this gives a
negligible ﬁtted c¼ 0.5310
 6 ’ 0, giving jDCtj,10 5 for Cc
  0.4. Hence, no colinear facilitation or suppression of input
sensitivities is needed to account for our data, or that our data
do not indicate that colinear inﬂuence could change the
effective contrast of the input.
Experiment 2: Colinear and Orthogonal Contexts
Experiment 2 was based on Figure 2A, to test that different
spatial conﬁgurations, one colinear and one orthogonal, of
the context can give rise to different prior probabilities P(yes)
according to observers’ belief. The colinear context was the
same as that in Experiment 1, while the orthogonal context
differs from the colinear one only by the orientation of the
contextual bars. The contextual contrast used were Cc ¼ 0.01
and 0.4, with another Cc¼0 serving as the no context baseline.
Five observers participated in this experiment, each took 20
trials for each condition of a given Ct, Cc, and spatial
conﬁguration of the context.
Figure 4 shows the results. Regardless of the contextual
conﬁguration, the yes rate is higher when the contextual
contrast Cc is lower, CFI (Cc ¼ 0.01)   CFI (Cc ¼ 0.4) .’0.4,
and a sufﬁciently high Cc gives negative CFI, biasing the
observers to respond ‘‘no.’’ For every contextual contrast Cc,
the colinear context gives a higher yes rate than the
orthogonal one, CFI(colinear)   CFI(orthogonal) .’0.23.
At low contextual contrast Cc, the colinear context biases the
response to ‘‘yes’’ (CFI . 0), while the orthogonal context
gives no signiﬁcant bias. These ﬁndings are consistent with
our qualitative arguments in Figure 2.
The data can be ﬁtted by the Bayesian model for the four
yes rate curves (two conﬁgurations 3 two contextual
contrasts) using only four parameters: k, rn, and the prior
probabilities P(yes)colinear and P(yes)orthogonal, with each data
point typically about one error bar size away from the model
ﬁt. As expected, P(yes)colinear . P(yes)orthogonal (Figure 4E).
However, both P(yes)colinear and P(yes)orthogonal are quite high.
This we believe is the net result of combining two factors, one
is the observers’ internal prior to reach roughly equal
numbers of ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ responses, and the other is the
contextual dependent priors from the statistical knowledge
of the natural visual environment. Indeed, the average yes
rate (over all trials and observers) is 57% 6 2%. The
difference between the ﬁtted P(yes)colinear and P(yes)orthogonal
reﬂects the difference between the natural priors that has
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laboratory experiment.
Experiment 3: Different Configurations of Colinear
Context
Experiment 3 shows that even subtle differences in
contextual conﬁguration can manifest in different biases in
inferences in ways consistent with the Bayesian account. It is
like Experiment 2, but with three colinear context: one is 2-
sided which is the one in Experiment 1, removing contextual
bars from one end of the target gives the 1-sided context,
while removing every alternate contextual bar gives the
sparce context, see Figure 5A. The non-zero contextual
contrasts are Cc ¼ 0.01, 0.05, and 0.4. Each of the seven new
observers took three sessions of data to perform a total of 27
trials for each context condition and Ct.
Figure 5B–5D show that, the yes rates in the three
contextual conﬁgurations are very similar for high contextual
contrast Cc¼0.4, but the 2-sided context gives the highest yes
rates under lower Cc¼0.01 and 0.05, having CFI values about
0.2 higher than those in other contexts. This is consistent with
the expectation that the 2-sided context should have the
highest prior, and that the subtler differences between the
conﬁgurations are more easily manifested under lower Cc
conditions when observers rely more on the priors for their
decisions. Meanwhile, as in Experiments 1 and 2, yes rates
decrease with increasing Cc in all contextual conﬁgurations.
Figure 6 demonstrates that the data in the nine yes rate
curves for the non-zero contexts in this experiment can be
reasonably well ﬁtted by the Bayesian model using only 5
parameters—k, rn, and the three P(yes) values for the three
contextual conﬁgurations. The P(yes) for the 2-sided context
is indeed the highest, even though, as in Experiment 2, the
differences between the three P(yes)’s must be reduced, by the
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 2 Averaged Over Five Observers
(A,B) Yes rates under colinear and orthogonal context (schematically like Figure 2A), respectively. The curves are the Bayesian fits. The four Bayesian
parameters (and their 95% confidence intervals) are k¼3.8 (1.8, 5.8), rn¼0.0027 (0.0021, 0.0033), P(yes)colinear¼0.982 (0.974, 0.989), and P(yes)orthogonal¼
0.88 (0.85, 0.92), giving a fitting quality of RMSNFE ¼ 1.0.
(C,D) Yes rates under different contextual contrast Cc¼0.01 and Cc¼0.4, respectively, together with those under no context. For colinear context CFI¼
0.23 6 0.05 and 0.18 6 0.15 for Cc¼0.01 and 0.4, respectively; for orthogonal context CFI¼ 0.018 6 0.06 and 0.46 6 0.055 for Cc ¼0.01 and 0.4,
respectively.
(E) Prior P(yes) for the two contextual configurations. The error bars denote SEMs in (A–D), and 95% confidence intervals in (E).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g004
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the natural priors.
Discussion
Summary of Results
Using simple visual stimuli of bars familiar in psychophys-
ical and physiological studies of input sensitivities, our study is
one of the ﬁrst to investigate how visual context bias the
perception of such visual inputs. In particular, the perception is
of the presence or absence of a target bar of a known
orientation and shape at a central location given a low or zero
input contrast at this location, in the context of other input
bar stimuli. We showed that high contrast contextual bars
bias the observers to perceive no target bars, as if the context
suppresses the perception of the target. Meanwhile, low
contrast contextual bars aligned with the target bar bias the
observers to perceive a target bar, even when there is zero
target contrast in the input image, as if the context ﬁlls in the
target. This ﬁlling-in bias is stronger when the contextual bars
have weaker contrasts, and when the target is seen as more
likely to group with the context as a straight line.
We show additionally that these ﬁndings, unexpected from
previous ﬁndings of contextual facilitation on input sensitiv-
ities, can be accounted for by a Bayesian inference and
decision model. The model assumes that the perception
results from an inference of the posterior probability
PðyesjCtÞ}PðyesÞPðCtjyesÞ from the following factors: (1) a
context dependent prior belief of probability P(yes) and P(no)
¼1 P(yes) of possible visual events ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ regarding
the target’s presence, (2) a (noisy) observation of visual input
(contrast) Ct, and (3) the brain’s internal model of the context
dependent probability P(Ct j yes)o rP(Ct j no) of the Ct that
Figure 5. Stimuli (Schematics) and Data for Experiment 3.
(A) The schematics of the stimuli.
(B–D) Yes rates (with SEM error bars) averaged over seven observers. The 2-sided context gives higher yes rates than other contexts for Cc¼0.01 (B) and
Cc¼0.05 (C), but not significantly for Cc¼0.4 (D) when yes rates are all depressed relative to those under no context. The yes rates given a contextual
configuration decrease with increasing Cc. Error bars indicate SEM. CFI under the 2-sided, 1-sided, and sparse contexts are respectively: CFI ¼ 0.42 6
0.06, 0.17 6 0.04, and 0.19 6 0.04, for Cc¼0.01, CFI¼0.204 6 0.06, 0.016 6 0.07, and 0.05 6 0.06 for Cc¼0.05, and CFI¼ 0.11 6 0.07, 0.18 6 0.05,
and  0.13 6 0.06 for Cc ¼ 0.4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g005
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better grouped with the target leads to a stronger prior belief
P(yes) of a target’s presence. A weak or even zero input
contrast Ct is a more plausible evidence for a target (P(Ct j yes)
  0) in a weaker contextual contrast Cc, since the target is
also expected to have a low contrast. In such a case, since
evidence P(Ct j no) for Ct as caused by noise is also non-
negligible, the input signal-to-noise is often insufﬁcient to
dictate the inference, making the inferred probability P(yes j
Ct) easily swayed by the prior P(yes). This leads to ﬁlling-in
when input contrast Ct ¼ 0 but inferred probability P(yes j Ct)
for the target is substantial. In contrast, a high contrast of the
contextual bars makes a weak input contrast Ct as seem
unlikely caused by a target rather than noise, i.e., P(Ct j yes) ’
0, suppressing the perception of target, i.e., P(yes j Ct) ’ 0,
even with a large prior belief P(yes).
Relating to Previous Studies
The ﬁlling-in and suppression of the target respectively in
our study is not unlike the visual assimilation and contrast
respectively in the perception of brightness [20], color [21,22],
tilt [23], or motion direction [24], when the contextual
features (brightness, color, tilt, motion) make the target
feature appear to shift, respectively, towards or away from the
contextual feature. At least in the motion perception, there is
also a similar correlation between motion capture versus
motion contrast (or induction), analogous to our ﬁlling-in
versus suppression, and the low versus high signal-to-noise of
inputs [24]. In the image encoding process before object
inference, there is a similar relationship between the shape of
the receptive ﬁelds and the signal-to-noise in input—when
the input noise is high, the receptive ﬁelds of the retinal
ganglion cells are large and not spatially opponent, leading to
input smoothing which is similar to assimilation; when the
input noise is low, the receptive ﬁelds have the center-
surround spatially opponent shape to enhance input con-
trast. Such a strategy at the input encoding stage has been
understood computationally by efﬁcient coding of visual
input information [25,26].
The ﬁndings in higher level vision [3,14,15,27,28] that
consistent context can facilitate or speed up object recog-
nition or attentional guidance is analogous to our ﬁnding
that contexts that can be more easily grouped with the would-
be target is more conducive to ﬁlling-in, reﬂecting an
inference based on information redundancy or correlations
in natural scenes. Analogous phenomena of perceptual
completion from context are also ubiquitous in mid-level
vision [29], including the completion of the missing or
incomplete information on object surface color [4], and on
occluded or unoccluded surface boundaries [30].
Compared with most of the previous studies on the
inﬂuences by the spatial context, our study uses simpler
stimuli that can be more easily or quantitatively manipulated
and described. Consequently, we not only model our data
using a simple Bayesian inference and decision model, but
also use this model to deduce that, at least in inference, the
underlying neural mechanisms do not cause contextual
facilitation or suppression of input sensitivities observed at
Figure 6. Fit to Data in Experiment 3 by the Bayesian Model
(A–C) The red, magenta, and blue curves and data points indicate respective quantities associated with different contextual contrasts Cc ¼ 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.4, respectively. The fitted Bayesian parameters (and their 95% confidential intervals) are k¼3.91 (1.95, 5.87), rn¼1.60310
 3 (1.45310
 3, 1.733
10
 3), and P(yes)¼0.97 (0.96, 0.98) for the 2-sided, P(yes)¼0.87 (0.83, 0.91) for the 1-sided, and P(yes)¼0.92 (0.89, 0.95) for the sparse context. RMSNFE¼
1.07.
(D) The prior P(yes) for the three different contextual configurations. The error bars denote SEMs in (A–C), and 95% confidence intervals in (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0040014.g006
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[4,14], using more controlled stimuli, have also shown that
human inference is like that of an ideal observer in a Bayesian
inference. In these studies, the Bayesian inferences were
based on the known or built in statistics of visual inputs. In
comparison, we model a Bayesian inﬂuence using a model of the
visual input statistics, parameterized by P(yes), k, and rn,
which we show is consistent with the Gestalt grouping laws which
in turn is presumably based on the actual statistics of natural
visual inputs. Furthermore, since the target input was
independent of the context in the stimulus presentation by
the experimenter, the observers’ context-dependent percep-
tion of the target suggests that they did not modify their
internal belief or statistical model of the visual world by
sampling the recent stimulus inputs for this task.
Discussions of Various Issues
Context can change sensitivity to input bars (or bar like
elements such as gabors) as manifested behaviorally in 2AFC
tasks for target detection [8–12], as if the context effectively
changes the input contrast. The primary visual cortex has
been argued as the neural substrate for such contextual
inﬂuences [5,6,31]. However, in our yes–no task probing the
inference process, the context does not shift the perceived
input contrast from the veridical one according to our model,
suggesting that either the brain areas receiving inputs from
V1 can somehow distinguish between input sensitivities and
input contrast (see [13,32] for related ﬁndings), or that the
yes–no task somehow evokes the brain to turns off the
contextual inﬂuences on input sensitivites [33,34]. Hence, the
neural substrates responsible for visual inference, in partic-
ular for associating neural response xt with the probability
P(yes j xt) for a target object, may be beyond V1. This is
consistent with the physiological ﬁnding [35,36] that V2
rather than V1 is more likely responsible for the illusory
contours or disparity capture inferred from the contextual
inducers [37], analogous to our ﬁlled-in target induced by the
context. Also consistent with our ﬁnding is the observation
[38] that neurons in V2 but not V1 respond to illusory
brightness of Cornsweet illusion which manifests the infer-
ence of surface (but not image) properties, analogous to the
inference of a target object but not contrast features in our
task. However, our ﬁnding does not preclude the possibility
that the inference signals being fed back to V1 from higher
cortical areas in subsequent or more advanced processes of
inferrence [39,40]. Different mechanisms for input discrim-
ination (sensitivity) and object appearance (inference) have
also been demonstrated behaviorally in luminance and
surface processing [41].
In previous studies of contextual inﬂuence on visual
inferences, researchers probed perception by asking the
observers to report the appearance, e.g., color and motion
direction, of the stimuli. Our study may seem different by
asking for reports of whether the target is perceived or not,
rather than the appearance, e.g., apparent contrast. However,
in essence, the question of ‘‘whether you perceive the target
or not’’ is not unlike a question ‘‘whether the luminance
proﬁle at this location appears as if it is caused by a target or
by noise,’’ which probes the appearance of the perception
evoked by the input at the image location concerned. If we
had instead asked for reports of apparent contrast, these
reports may or may not directly reﬂect the process of inferring
the underlying surface objects causing the contrast; rather, they
may instead reﬂect the process of encoding the 2-D image
p r o p e r t y .I nap r e v i o u ss t u d yo nc o l o rm a t c h i n g[ 4 2 ] ,
observers’ responses when asked about the hue and satu-
ration of input showed little color constancy, i.e., the
responses did not reﬂect the underlying surface causes;
meanwhile, for the same input, when asked about the
underlying paper (objects which reﬂected the color for the
input), the responses showed color constancy. We believe that
our request to report the target’s presence or absence is more
like the request to report on the paper object, thus probing
inference.
It is in principle possible that the bias in the observers’
reports did not arise from the inference stage (which gives
P(yes j Ct), or more strictly, P(yes j xt)), but from the subsequent
decision stage, when a threshold value Pth is chosen such that
a response ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ is given if P(yes j xt) . Pth or
otherwise respectively [43]. The decision bias would be
manifested in the choice of Pth, e.g., Pth ¼ 0.5, 0.1, or 0.9.
Our experiments can not distinguish between these two types
of biases. However, if the bias was indeed only in the decision
(in terms of Pth), then the inference P(yes j xt) is independent
of the context. Without any insight on how contexts bias the
decision threshold Pth, the decision bias has to be modelled by
introducing one model parameter for each contextual
condition (deﬁned by a particular combination of the
conﬁguration and contrast Cc of the context), in addition to
the model parameters for the unbiased inference P(yes j Ct)o r
P(yes j xt) shared by all contextual conditions. Hence decision
bias is a less parsimonious model to account for our data
since it would require more model parameters than our
model of inference bias. In addition, other than a numerical
value Pth, the decision bias does not give any insight in why
and how the decision should be biased by context when the
inference is unbiased. It is most likely that our measured yes
rate results from the combined effect of (1) a context speciﬁc
inference bias in the posterior P(yes j xt), and (2) a context
independent decision bias in Pth arising from observers’
wishes to give the ‘‘yes’’ response in roughly half of all trials.
As our task can not distinguish between these two biases, our
ﬁtted values for P(yes) manifest the combined effect from both
biases, as discussed in the Results section.
One may wonder whether the sensitivities in the 2AFC task
could be derived as the derivatives of the psychometric
function (the yes rate) observed in our yes–no task using the
same stimuli [44]. The answer is not so. First, it is likely, as
discussed earlier, that different mechanisms are involved in
input discrimination (for assessing sensitivity) and object
inference, such that the input sensitivities and yes rates may
not be so simply related. The second reason for the negative
answer is the following. The 2AFC tasks were typically
performed in blocked sessions, each having only a single
contextual condition, while our yes–no design randomly
interleaves trials of the different contextual conditions, such
that observers compensate fewer ‘‘yes’’ responses in one
contextual condition by more ‘‘yes’’ responses in another
within a single session. Hence, the yes rates in one context is
inﬂuenced by the other contexts interleaved within the same
experimental session. Consequently, the three yes rate curves
in the same no context condition in our three experiments
are different from each other, and none of them could be
simply related to the sensitivites in the 2AFC task performed
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yes–no design, different biases to respond ‘‘yes’’ for a gabor
target in different colinear contexts (in terms of different
target-context distances), when trials of different contextual
conditions were interleaved. In comparison with their study,
the current study additionally reveals how this bias depends
on the contextual contrast, how a Bayesian model can explain
the data, and our additional data and the model have enabled
us to show that there is no colinear facilitation or suppression
of target contrast in such a visual inference task.
In our model, the parameters k and rn reﬂect the brain’s
internal model of the sensory world and its encoding. This
internal model adapts quickly to the statistics of the external
inputs [46], in particular, to the collection of the inputs
presented in an experiment. Therefore, our different experi-
ments, using different collections of stimuli, will evoke
different internal models, as manifested by the different
values of the model parameters k and rn.
Our observers seemed unconsciously to use prior beliefs
induced by context, despite our instructions informing them
that the context was irrelevant to the task. Furthermore, they
could quickly switch from one prior to another as the context
changes from one trial to another. However, these different
priors are only different from the perspective of the target
alone. When combining target and context as a whole, the
joint prior probability of the visual input in principle arises
from the same underlying probability distribution [47] of
visual inputs derived from the ecological experience of the
observers. Combining computational modeling with psycho-
physical experiments using easily controlled stimuli, the
method in this study enables linking the visual inference
behavior with plausible neural substrates. The current study
is only a beginning of using such a method, which can be a
powerful tool in future studies of visual inference processes.
Materials and Methods
Stimuli. The stimuli were shown on a gamma-corrected 21 inch
Sony GDM-F520 monitor using 14-bits luminance resolution. The
viewing distance was 67.6 cm, and the screen width was 40
centimeters. All stimulus (target or contextual) bars were rectangular
shapes of 0.9830.1658 in visual angle, with a luminance Lmax no
smaller than the background luminance of Lmin¼15.6 cd/m
2 such that
the contrast of a bar is (Lmax Lmin)/(LmaxþLmin); the vertical target bar
was always at the display center. Pilot experments established that the
contrast detection threshold without contexts is around Ct ¼ 0.005,
measured in a 2AFC task with the stair case method. The stimuli were
always presented with four black discs, of size 0.28 in diameter, at the
four corners of an imaginary square centered at the target location,
the side of this square is 18 in visual angle. These four black discs
alone on the background also served as the ﬁxation stimulus.
Procedure. Each observer was between 18–40 years old, had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and participated in only one exper-
ment. The experiments were carried out in a dimly lit room. Each
trial began with the ﬁxation display for 500 ms, followed by the test
stimulus display for 80 ms together with an auditory beep, which is
then followed by the ﬁxation display which stayed on waiting for
observers’ button press response to indicate whether they perceived
the target or not in the trial. No feedbacks were given regarding
whether their responses were correct. The next trial started 800 ms
after the button press. A total of 20 randomly selected trials were
performed before data collection for each observer before each
session. Each experimental session randomly interleaved different
stimulus conditions, such that the observers could not predict beyond
chance the target contrast Ct, nor the contextual conﬁguration and
contrast Cc before each trial.
Appendix. Formulation of the Bayesian inﬂuence and decision. Here we
formulate our Bayesian inference and decision model in more detail.
In a single trial, xt and xc are the neural responses to the target and the
context respectively. The target stimuli is uniquely described by the
target contrast Ct, as its other aspects (orientation, location, etc) are
ﬁxed. The contextual input is determined by both its contrast Cc and
its spatial conﬁguration Sc (describing orientation and location).
Neural and input noise make xt a random variable according to a
conditional probability P(xt j Ct)o fxt given Ct, and similarly, xc
according to P(xc j Cc, Sc). The brain infers whether xt is caused by a
target or noise for the observer to respond ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ to the
question ‘‘is the target present?’’ This inference is partly based on the
brain’s internal model, expressed in conditional probability, P(xt j yes)
or P(xt j no), of how likely xt can be by target or non-target cause, when
the brain assumes the target is present or abstract respectively.
Contextual inﬂuences on the internal model P(xt j yes) is indicated by
adding a subscript xc,i nPxcðxtjyesÞ, denoting that P(xt j yes)i s
parameterized by xc (we assume for simplicity that the context does
not inﬂuence P(xt j no)). The inference is also partly based on the
context dependent prior probability PxcðyesÞ, assumed by the brain,
that a target bar should be present. By the Bayesian formula, the
brain infers from xt that the probability for a target to be present in
this trial is
PðyesjxtÞ¼
PxcðxtjyesÞPxcðyesÞ
PxcðxtjyesÞPxcðyesÞþPðxtjnoÞð1   PxcðyesÞÞ
: ð7Þ
If the observer responds ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ the probability of error is 1
 P(yes j xt)o rP(yes j xt), respectively. To minimize error (assuming that
the error rate is the loss function for the decision), the optimal
response is ‘‘yes’’ when P(yes j xt) . 0.5 and ‘‘no’’ otherwise. Averaging
over many trials of ﬂuctuating neural and observer responses, we
obtain the probability of ‘‘yes’’ response for a given target and
contextual stimuli (Ct, Cc, Sc):
PðyesjCtÞ¼
Z
dxtPðxtjCtÞ
Z
dxcPðxcjCc;ScÞHðPðyesjxtÞ 0:5Þ; ð8Þ
where H(.) is a step function such that H(x) ¼ 1 or 0 when x . 0o r
otherwise, respectively.
The posterior probability P(yes j Ct) should depend on Ct, Cc, and Sc,
with some functional parameters derived from the functional
parameters in PxcðxtjyesÞ, P(xt j no), P(xt j Ct), P(xc j Cc, Sc), and PxcðyesÞ.
For our purpose, all we need is to parameterize the dependence of
P(yes j Ct)o nCt, Cc, and Sc by a suitable phenomenological model that
has enough parameters, but, applying Occam’s razor, not too many.
Hence, we use the following Ansatz
PðyesjCtÞ¼
PðCtjyesÞPðyesÞ
PðCtjyesÞPðyesÞþPðCtjnoÞð1   PðyesÞÞ
ð9Þ
using three phenomenological parameters: one is P(yes) to parameter-
ize the dependence on Sc, and the other two rn and k, parameterizing
the dependence on Cc and Ct, are deﬁned in the deﬁnition of P(Ct j yes)
and P(Ct j no)a s
PðCtjnoÞ¼
expð Ct=rnÞ
Nn
; ð10Þ
PðCtjyesÞ¼
expð jCt   Ccj=ðkCcÞÞ
Ny
; ð11Þ
where Nn and Ny are normalization constants such that R 1
0 dCtPðCtjnoÞ¼1 and
R 1
0 dCtPðCtjyesÞ¼1.
While an Ansatz is typically justiﬁed by its suitability in
accounting for the data, as demonstrated in the main text for the
Ansatz above, here we provide some motivations behind this Ansatz.
For ease of presentation, we abbreviate the integration R
dxtPðxtjCtÞ
R
dxcPðxcjCc;ScÞ over internal variables by
H
dX. Equation
8 suggests an approximation PðyesjCtÞ’
H
dXPðyesjxtÞ. Then, the
certainty equivalent approximation of this equation suggests
Equation 9, with approximations PðCtjyesÞ’
H
dXPxcðxtjyesÞ,
PðCtjnoÞ’
H
dXPðxtjnoÞ, and PðyesÞ’
H
dXPxcðyesÞ. These approxima-
tions do not need to be accurate, since the model parameters are to
be ﬁtted by behavioral data rather than derived from integrating
these equations. They simply serve to suggest that Equation 9 is a
suitable phenomenological model, with P(yes) the phenomenological
prior, and P(Ct j yes)o rP(Ct j no) the phenomenological conditional
probability, assumed by the brain, that the input contrast should be
Ct for a target bar or otherwise, respectively.
The model PðCtjnoÞ}expð Ct=rnÞ is motivated by the brain’s
internal model that, without a target, the perceived Ct is more likely
zero than another value Ct . 0. Under a simplifying assumption that
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org February 2008 | Volume 4 | Issue 2 | e14 0011
Filling-In and Suppression from ContextPxcðyesÞ is inﬂuenced only by the contextual conﬁguration Sc,
PðyesÞ}
H
dXPxcðyesÞ becomes a mere parameter for each contextual
conﬁguration. Meanwhile, the form of P(Ct j yes) is motivated by its
approximation
R
dxtdxcPðxtjCtÞPðxcjCc;ScÞPxcðxtjyesÞ as follows. Physio-
logically [48,49], the encoding neural response is roughly a sigmoid-
like function of the logarithm of input contrast, i.e., xc ¼ g(logCc)þ
noise, with g(.)denoting this sigmoid like function. Thus, PðxcjCc;ScÞ
peaks around xc ¼ gðlogCcÞ and decreases with jxc   gðlogCcÞj (this is
presumably the basis of the Weber law: that the behavorially just
discriminable contrast difference between a pedestal contrast and a
second contrast is proportional to the pedestal contrast). Similarly,
PðxtjCtÞ peaks around xt ¼ gðlogCtÞ and descreases with jxt   gðlogCtÞj.
Assuming again for simplicity that PxcðxtjyesÞ is only inﬂuenced by the
contextual contrast Cc, the response xc to a context bar makes the
brain expect that xt should resemble xc (which are
after all examples of neural responses to stimulus bars), making
PxcðxtjyesÞ peak around xt ’xc. Combining these observations,
PðCtjyesÞ’
R
dxtdxcPðxtjCtÞPðxcjCc;ScÞPxcðxtjyesÞ as a function of Ct and
Cc should depend approximately on the difference logCc   logCt or
the ratio Ct/Cc. The model PðCtjyesÞ}expð jCt   Ccj=ðkCcÞÞ suits such a
form, whereas an alternative like PðCtjyesÞ}expð jCt   Ccj=rcÞ (with a
ﬁxed parameter rc) would not.
Other additional variabilities, such as the perceived locations of
the stimulus, would behave analogously to the internal variables xt
and xc which should be integrated over, as in Equation 8, to arrive at
the experimental observation P(yes j Ct). One could generalize the
deﬁnition of xt and xc, making each a vector with multiple
components for multiple variables, e.g., the ﬁrst component of xt
for the neural response to the target contrast, the second the neural
representation for the target location, etc. Repeating the above
derivations would lead us again to Equation 9. By not detailing these
additional variables, we are assuming that they will not signiﬁcantly
affect the suitability of our phenomenological model in Equations 9–
11. The ﬁtted model parameters manifest the combined effects from
all the variables xt and xc, even though only a fraction of them play a
dominant role.
Considering contextual inﬂuences on the encoding process. Context could
affect the target encoding by changing P(xt j Ct). We consider a
situation when context could change input sensitivity such that the
encoding neurons respond as if the input contrast is effectively
C
effective
t ¼ Ct þ DCt 6¼ Ct.I fP(xt j Ct) without the context takes a
functional form P(xt j Ct) ¼ F(xt, Ct) where F(.) is some function of xt
and Ct, the contextual inﬂuence makes PðxtjCtÞ¼Fðxt;C
effective
t Þ. This
motivates the phenomenological formulation to modify the right-
hand side of Equation 9 such that Ct is replaced by C
effective
t . This
contextual inﬂuence in encoding can then be phenomenologically
modelled by parameterizing the dependence of DCt on the context as,
e.g., DCt ’ cCc, as done in the main text.
Proof of PCc2ðCtjyesÞ.PCc1ðCtjyesÞ when Ct , Cc2 , Cc1 for contextual
contrasts Cc1 and Cc2 concerned. We use subscript Cc in PCcðCtjyesÞ to
denote that this probability of target contrast Ct is parameterized by
contextual contrast Cc. When PCcðCtjyesÞ¼expð jCt   Ccj=ðkCcÞÞ=Ny
with Ny ¼ kCc½2   expð 1=kÞ expð 1=ðkCcÞþ1=kÞ , we have, denot-
ing Ny for Cc1 and Cc2 as Ny(1) and Ny(2), respectively,
PCc2ðCtjyesÞ
PCc1ðCtjyesÞ
¼ exp½ðCt=kÞ
1
Cc2
 
1
Cc1
  
 
Nyð1Þ
Nyð2Þ
ð12Þ
Since exp½ðCt=kÞ 1
Cc2   1
Cc1
  
  1,
PCc2ðCtjyesÞ
PCc1ðCtjyesÞ.1i f
Nyð1Þ
Nyð2Þ.1. Note that
NyðiÞ[wi þ /i where wi ¼
R Cc1þCc2
0 exp½ jC   Ccij=ðkCciÞ dC and /i ¼
R 1
Cc1þCc2 exp½ ðC   CciÞ=ðkCciÞ dC for i¼1,2. Changing integration variable
C ! Cc1þ Cc2  C in w1 we have w1 ¼
R Cc1þCc2
0 exp½ jC   Cc2j=ðkCc1Þ dC,
hence w1.w2 ¼
R Cc1þCc2
0 exp½ jC   Cc2j=ðkCc2Þ dC given Cc1 . Cc2. Mean-
while, exp½ ðC   Cc1Þ=ðkCc1Þ  .exp½ ðC   Cc2Þ=ðkCc2Þ  for all C   Cc1 þ
Cc2.H e n c e ,/1./2 as long as Cc1þCc2 , 1, i.e., the contextual contrasts are
not super-saturating. This applies to all of our experimentally used contrasts
Cc   0.4. (In fact, when contextual contrasts are beyond this range, neural
responses are saturating and our phenomenological model of the form
PCcðCtjyesÞ}expð jCt   Ccj=ðkCcÞÞ may or may not be the most suitable.)
Hence, Ny(1) . Ny(2), and then PCc2ðCtjyesÞ.PCc1ðCtjyesÞ.
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